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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
HAROLD MICHAEL BROWN,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
10759

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant in this action was charged with
Second Degree Burglary of an automobile of one Ronald L. Call. The case was tried before a Jury and a
verdict of guilty returned by the Jury. At the trial, the
principal witness, Ronald L. Call, testified regarding
the facts surrounding the alleged burglary and during
direct examination was permitted over counsel for Defendant's objection, to testify regarding the prior location of certain items of personal property. (TR. of
Trial p. 14). The Court permitted Ronald L. Call to
testify to the conclusions of fact to be proved which
were the ultimate issue.
1

At the conclusion of the evidence the Court instructed the Jury. The counsel for Defendant prepared
an instruction on the recent possession of stolen property
which was rejected by the Court and an exception duly
taken by counsel for the Defendant. (TR. of Trial
p. 25).
On the 15th day of July, 1966, the Defendant was
sentenced by the Honorable Maurice Harding. The
Court denied the Defendant probation on the ground
that Defendant had items of personal property in his
automobile at the time of the arrest and therefore the
Court concluded he had committed burglaries on many
other occasions. (TR. of pronouncement of Judgment
p. 3)
From the verdict of the Jury and the Judgment
entered therein, and from the sentence of the trial court,
the Appellant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the Judgment and
verdict and the granting of a new trial or that failing
that the sentence should be declared void.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF RONALD L.
CALL TO THE CONCLUSION OF FACT TO
BE PROVED.
The State called as its principal witness at the
2

trial of this case Ronald L. Call. The State on direct
examination of said witness asked (TR. of Trial p. 4).
"Where did he get those to hand them back

to you?"

Before the witness answered, counsel for Defendant
objected and over his objection the witness Ronald L.
Call answered,
"Out of my car."
The somewhat narrow question on appeal under
this assignment of error is whether or not it was proper
for the trial judge to permit Ronald L. Call to testify
and state his opinion as to the ultimate issue. The location of the items of personal property raised at least
inferentially, the unlawful entry upon which the case
turns.
A substantial number of courts have gone far
enough to rule out a witness's views as to how the Judge
and jury should exercise their function and have announced the general doctrine that witnesses will not be
permitted to give their opinions or conclusions upon an
ultimate fact in issue.1
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has examined this problem and in the case of State vs. Carr, et
al stated the majority position and its reasoning:
"As a rule the witness is required to state facts
he observed and relied on as the basis of his opinion so far as they permit of a detailed enumeration. Such a statement of the facts affords an
1

State vs. Carr, 196 N.C. 129, 144 S.E. 698.

3

opportunity of testing the reasonableness of his
in~e~ence, ~or ~ witness may not express an
opm1on which fmds no support in the facts he
enumerates."
The reason is sometimes stated that such testimonv
if admitted invades the province of the J ury.2 The co~
cern is not that the expressions be taken literally by the
Jury but that if admitted will encourage the Jury to
forego independent analysis of the facts and bow too
:readily to the remarks made by the witness.
The answer solicited by the prosecutor called for
an opinion of a mixed question of law and fact. When
a standard has been fixed by law, the entry in a burglary
prosecution, no witness should be permitted to express
an opinion as to whether or not the person or conduct
measures up to that standard. On that question the
Court must instruct as to the law and the Jury be
permitted to draw its own conclusion from the evidence)
The dangers of permitting such statements are
obvious. At the trial of any criminal action the Jury is
required to pass upon the credibility of the State's witnesses. If the principal witness, who generally also is the
victim is entitled to express the ultimate issue to be
proved, the Jury might be far more impressed by that
testimony than any of the other evidence offered in the
case. Having heard the victim state the ultimate issue,
what else need they hear?
2 DeGroat vs. Winter, 261 Mich. 660, 247 N.W. 69.
3 Federal Underwriters Exchange vs. Cost, 132 Texas 299, 123
s.w. 2d 332, 334, 335.
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The Defendant submits that to permit this principal witness to testify to the ultimate issue, and to
admit this improper evidence was reversible error on
the part of the trial judge.
POINT II
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S REFUSAL TO
GRANT THE DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION ON RECENT POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY IS ERROR.
The defendant requested that the Court give the
following instruction and the same was denied by the
trial judge.
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION

No. I
In order to presume that the Defendant was
guilty of burglary as charged in the information,
you may consider the fact that the Defendant was
in recent possession of stolen property. However,
you must determine that the possession is sufficiently recent as to exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis for said possession. In making this
determination you must also find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the possession was personal,
exclusive, and knowledgeable in the Defendant.
You are further instructed that you cannot
convict the Defendant solely upon his possession
of said property, but you must consider the possession with other facts or circumstances tending
to connect the Defendant with the unlawful entry
into the vehicle of Ronald Leroy Call as the law

5

in Utah is that the mere bare possession when
not coupled with other culpatory or incriminat·
ing ~ir~umstances does not suffice to justify a
conviction.
Further you are instructed that if only the
cri~e of larceny is inferred by virtue of the possession of stolen property from a burglarious
entry, this also does not suffice to warrant a conviction and you must, therefore, find the Defendant not guilty.
The law in Utah regarding recent possession appears to be relatively clear. 4 There may or may not have
been corroborating circumstances in the case at bar.
However, the Appellant submits that the offense of
burglary is ordinarily removed one degree further from
the act of larceny and the possession of stolen goods
does not have the same tendency to connect the Appellant with burglary as it would with larceny.
Appellant therefore was entitled to have his cautionary instruction on recent possession. Without same
the Jury was entitled to conclude that by virtue of the
possession the entry was made. Appellant contends that
the Court should have instructed that possession was to
be considered as any other factual circumstance in arriving at its conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the
Appellant. It seems to be established that recent pos·
session of stolen property by itself will not suffice to
sustain a conviction. The possession must be considered
along with other facts and/ or circumstances which tend
4 State vs. Crawford, 59 U. 39, 201 P. 1030.
State vs. Kimsey, 77 U. 348, 295 P. 247.
state vs. Nichols, 106 U. 104, 145 P.2d 802.
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to suggest involvement on the part of the Appellant with
an unlawful entry.
Appellant contends that the Court's failure to
give his instruction was prejudicial as it influenced the
Jury's determination in that it was not fair and impartial. Refusal to grant the instruction denied to Appellant the law applicable to his theory of the case.
The Appellant was entitled to have his instruction
given as to recent possession of stolen property if supported by any evidence regardless of however weak, insufficient, or doubtf'ul in credibility it may be.5
It should be immaterial that the uncontradicted

facts would put little weight in the instruction if given.
All issues should be fairly and clearly stated to the Jury
and the failure to instruct upon this issue was reversible
error on the part of the trial judge.
POINT III
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S REFUSAL TO
GRANT THE DEFENDANT PROBATION
ON THE GROUND THAT HE HAD COMMITED BURGLARIES ON MANY OTHER
OCCASIONS AND REQUIRED HIM TO TESTIFY AGAINST HIMSELF CONSTITUTES
ERROR.
Title 77-35-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that:
5 Gibson vs. State, 89 Ala. 121, 8 So. 93.
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_"Upon a plea.?~ guilty or conviction of any
crnne or offense, if it appears compatible with the
public interes_t, the ~-ourt having jurisdiction may
suspend the 11npos1t10n or the execution of sentence, and may place the Defendant on probation
for such period of time as the Court shall determine."
The statute contemplates that if it is compatible
with the public interest a Defendant convicted of a
crime may be placed on probation, and it vests in the
trial judge's discretionary power to determine whether
or not it is compatible with the public interest that the
Defendant be placed on probation.
The exercise of any such discretion must be upon
a sound and proper basis. The court in this case in sentencing the Defendant Brown ref used the Defendant
probation and based this refusal largely upon the fact
that the Defendant had various personal property and
tools in his automobile.
The Court said:
"You have probably been around committing burglaries and prowling on cars for a long
time. If you would have told us the truth,
you would likely have been doing t_hat for_a long
time. You had your car loaded with eqmpment
with which to do those things." (TR Pronouncement of Judgment, p. 3.)
This Court speaking in the Siebert case6 concluded
that an arbitrary denial of probation based upon irrel6 State vs. Siebert, 6 U.2d 198, 310 P.2d 388.
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evant and improper considerations resulting in an abuse
of direction by the trial judge would permit review of
his actions.
Unfortunately the record below neglects to disclose
the circumstances under which the information as to the
contents of the car come into possession of the Court or
the probation department. However, it is apparent from
the comments by the Judge that he relied heavily upon
same in making his determination as to the granting
or denial of probation for this Defendant.
The various hearings with respect to the Defendant
disclose that this information was never given voluntarily but rather was in the possession of the probation and
Parole Department at the time of sentencing (TR. of
Hearing p. 3.) The contents of the car were fully inventoried at the time of Defendant's arrest without
warrant while the Defendant was in custody. Arising
out of said search of the Defendant's car, was a charge
against this defendant7 for violation of section 32-7-31
U.C.A. 1953. The only record relative to the search and
seizure is by reference to a minute entry in the City
Court of Provo City, County of Utah, State of Utah,
and what one might ascertain from the Transcript of
Hearing held on July 29, 1966.
MINUTE ENTRY
This case came on regularly for trial with a jury
this 19th day of May, 1966. Arnold C. Roylance, Utah
7 Preston vs. United States, 376 U.S. 364.
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County Attorney, present in Court for plaintiff. Defendant present in Court with his counsel, Robert Van
Seiver. On roll call all jurors were present. The Court
administered the oath to the jurors. At the request of
counsel for Defendant, all jurors were excused, and Mr.
Van Seiver moved the Court to dismiss the Complaint
because of unlawful Search and Seizure. Motion denied.
Jurors returned. Both parties are ready to proceed. The
following were empanelled tn try this case: 1. Dale
Wall; 2. Margaret Orvil; 3. Vilate Olson, and 4. Mary
Frost. Arnold C. Roylance made his opening statement.
Counsel for Defendant reserved his opening statement
until later. Robert Henry 'Valz, D 1105 John Hall,
B.Y.U. (4900 Cherry Street, Vancouver, Washington)
sworn and testified for Plaintiff. Richard Michael
Lopez, D 1102 John Hall, B.Y.U. (512 East Haltern,
Glendora, California) sworn and testified for Plaintiff.
Mr. Walz called on rebuttal. James Earl Lindsay,
B.Y.U. Security Officer, sworn and testified for Plaintiff. At the request of counsel for Defendant, all jurors
were excused from the Courtroom, and he moved for a
dismissal because of unlawful Search and Seizure.
Motion taken under advisement, and Court in recess
until 2 :00 p.m. Court in session at 2 :30 p.m. All jurors
"\Vere present and were dismissed by the Court. After
deliberation, the Court grants the motion of counsel for
the Defendant, and this case is dismissed. By order of
the Court, the evidence is released from the custody of
the B.Y.U. Security Officers into the Custody of the
City Clerk.
Appellant contends that use of the evidence ob·
tained by this search violated Appellant's constitutional
rights. 8
s U.S. Const. Amend., 4 Utah Const. Art. 1, Sec. 14.
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And the case law construing same as the evidence
which is directly seized during an illegal search cannot
ever be admissable.9 The receipt of such inadmissable
evidence and its subsequent use was clearly an abuse of
the trial judge's discretion in making a determination
as to probation. Ample case authority exists that the
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment are available at
all stages of the trial. lo

It should also be noted that the Defendant in order

to avail himself of the guarantees afforded by the Fourth
Amendment was required to waive the guarantees of
the Fifth Amendment. 11 The requiring of Appellant to
waive one guarantee to invoke the other cannot be sustained as it clearly unvails the guarantees intended in
both Amendments.
The search of Defendant's automobile was not
material to the prosecution for burglary. What was disclosed by the search of Defendant's automobile was
material to sentencing on the burglary. To permit the
trial court to use this evidence under the circumstances
by which it was obtained against the Defendant is to
permit the State to avail itself of knowledge which it
otherwise would not have had.
In order to constitute a waiver of either amendment
it must be clearly shown that such waiver was voluntary
9 Silverthorne Lumber Co. vs. United States, 251 U.S. 385; Weeks

vs. U.S., 232 U.S. 383.
lo Saferick vs. U.S., 62 F.2d 892.
11 U.S. Const. Amend , 5 Utah Const., Art. 1, Sec. 12.
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and free from coercion or duress. What could be less
voluntary than the circumstances under which waiver
was made by this Defendant? Not waiving the rights
afforded by either Amendment and still going to prison?
Further in the hearing (TR. of Hearing p. 28)
after asking Counsel to admit the Defendant's guilt, the
Court required the Defendant to testify against himself
or go to prison, the Court commented, (TR. of Hearing
p. 28):

"It makes a difference to the Court whether or

not the Defendant recognizes any wrongdoing.
When a person asks for leniency we like to be
advised as to whether or not he is J.i\epentant. If a
man does not repent, I am not ready to release
. "
hrm.
If this reasoning of the Court is sound, and is a
valid basis for the exercising of the Court's discretion,
then a Defendant in a criminal action must decide after
he is convicted whether to confess guilt to the Court and
probation authorities, or face the denial of probation
and be committed to the penitentiary. The Defendant
cannot move for a new trial, or appeal his conviction
until after he has been sentenced, and under the theory
of the trial court in this case, unless he admits this guilt
after a verdict of guilty he cannot have probation. If he
were to confess guilt in order to retain his right of probation, and he was granted a new trial, the officials of the
probation department could appear as witnesses against
him. Thus the effect of the Court's reasoning in this case
is to force the Defendant to either testify against him-
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self, or have probation denied him. Such a requirement
would certainly violate the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States and would be a deprivation of any Defendant's rights. It places on the
Defendant a burden which is repugnant to our system
of law.
CONCLUSIONS
This Appellant respectfully contends that the trial
judge in permitting the testimony of Ronald L. Call
as to the ultimate issue, committed reversible and prejudicial error and that the trial judge's refusal to give
the Defendant's requested instruction denied the Appellant the law applicable to his theory of the case, and that
denying Defendant probation based upon the items in
his car and refusal to admit guilt, showed that it based
its exercise of discretion on an erroneous legal theory
which, if permitted, would require this Defendant to
testify against himself, and deny him the protection of
the Constitution.
Respectfully submitted,
KARRAS, VAN SCIVER & YOCOM
By Robert Van Seiver
Attorney for Defendant-Appelhtnt
661 East Fourth South

Salt Lake City, Utah
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